Sinicizing Paradiplomacy: Policy Ambition and Practical Reality
12 Nov, 2026.
XUEJUN LIU
CityDiplomacy.org
Introduction
When a provincial governor from China’s coastal economic engine travels to Southeast Asia to secure a multibillion-dollar high-tech investment, or when officials from an underdeveloped inland city orchestrate a high-profile international fair collaborating with local companies to drive investment promotion, they are not merely engaging in routine cross-border commerce. They are executing a highly coordinated yet distinctly localized form of statecraft. China’s subnational relations represent a flexible mode of foreign engagement compared to traditional high-level diplomacy, characterized by a notable degree of tactical autonomy in cultural exchange and economic development.
Traditionally, international relations scholars label such activity as paradiplomacy. However, while this jargon accurately describes the growing involvement of Chinese local governments in global affairs, it suffers from a significant conceptual mismatch when applied to China’s unique political logic. Set against the backdrop of an evolving centralized state, this article explores China’s distinct understanding of subnational diplomacy, the evolution of its policy environment, and the innovative practices of these local actors.
Conceptual Tension: Paradiplomacy or Delegated Subnational Diplomacy?
The dynamism of Chinese localities on the international stage, contrasted with the strict constraints of the country’s domestic constitutional structure, presents a long-debated puzzle. The concept of paradiplomacy predominantly emerged within federal or decentralized governance structures, where subnational entities engage in international relations through channels that often run parallel to, or even compete with, the central government’s foreign policy. In the Chinese context, however, provincial and municipal governments do not operate on an independent or parallel trajectory. Instead, their international engagements are systematically integrated into the national foreign policy framework. These subnational actions function as instruments that align closely with national objectives.
The distinctiveness of China’s subnational engagement is underpinned by rigid institutional arrangements and central-local dynamics. Local actors in China exhibit acute political acumen, strictly refraining from overstepping the definitive red line of the Party’s centralized leadership over foreign affairs (黨管外交) (Chen, 2018). Consequently, they lack the constitutional autonomy enjoyed by federal counterparts, such as those in Spain or Canada, to conduct genuinely independent foreign relations, that is, protodiplomacy (Cornago, 2018).
To reconcile this conceptual tension, the Chinese approach has effectively ‘Sinicized’ the concept of paradiplomacy. For years, the prevailing orthodoxy in Chinese political science, articulated by scholars including Zhao (1995) and Zhang (2015), framed local foreign affairs strictly through the lens of absolute compliance, insisting that subnational actions unconditionally mirror Beijing’s national dictates. However, this rigid paradigm has gradually evolved. Pioneering academics such as Chen (2001) reframed these entities under the broader, more elastic banner of “subnational governments,” a conceptual pivot designed to capture the nuanced agency of local actors, bridging the theoretical gap between unitary and federal systems. Today, this shift reflects a concrete geopolitical reality. Building on this theoretical foundation, recent observations of China’s subnational relations point to a new reality: local governments are demonstrating growing operational independence. Beyond merely executing mandates, they now possess the capacity to pioneer cross-border cooperation and the potential to shape Chinese foreign policymaking at the national level (Ren, 2017).
Quibbling over fine conceptual distinctions is not the point. Promisingly, a growing body of literature has undertaken theoretical and empirical explorations into non-Western frameworks tailored to the Chinese context (Liu and Song, 2020). These explorations underscore a fundamental rule that China’s local foreign affairs must unconditionally follow the central government’s policies. Yet, this compliance does not mean passivity. As China’s opening-up deepens, subnational actors have cultivated an increasingly independent functional role, developing the capacity to influence national foreign policymaking from the bottom up through sheer economic gravity and cross-border cooperation.
Policy Progress and Institutional Design
While Beijing has historically been cautious about endorsing sweeping paradiplomatic autonomy, the policy environment has notably shifted over the past decade. The central leadership has demonstrably increased its focus on the foreign exchanges of local governments. This paradigm shift was prominently articulated in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2014 speech at the China International Friendship Cities Conference, commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (Xi, 2014). Furthermore, in 2018, the Leading Small Group on Foreign Affairs of the CPC Central Committee (中央外事領導小組) was been elevated to the Central Foreign Affairs Commission (中央外事工作委員會) (The Central Committee of the CPC, 2018), signaling a robust institutionalization of centralized diplomatic management.
Institutionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the National Development and Reform Commission are quintessential representatives of this central-local interplay, catalyzing multi-layered diplomacy that empowers subnational actors to advance Beijing’s geopolitical and economic targets. As the primary coordinator of subnational diplomacy, the MFA seamlessly integrates local-level diplomatic activities into China’s broader foreign policy framework. For instance, the MFA has consistently underscored the strategic imperative of neighborhood diplomacy in border provinces such as Yunnan and Guangxi since 2013 (Nandkumar, 2025).
At the local level, Chinese subnational authorities have proactively aligned local regulatory frameworks with national development priorities. Anhui province introduced its Free Trade Zone Overall Plan in 2020 to balance pandemic controls with global economic integration (The State Council of the CPC, 2020). Similarly, Qinghai published a 2021 action plan to promote the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Belt and Road Portal, 2021), leveraging regional resource endowments to bolster local economic capacity. By deploying targeted mechanisms, such as tax incentives, specialized industrial subsidies, and proactive infrastructure investments, China’s local governments actively cultivate favorable environments for foreign direct investment.
Most recently, the Law on Foreign Relations of the PRC, enacted in July 2023, codified subnational foreign engagement in statutory form for the first time. Article 16 explicitly authorizes “provinces, autonomous regions, and directly governed municipalities to conduct foreign exchanges and cooperation within the specific scope authorized by the central government (MFA of the PRC, 2023).” This is profoundly significant because it provides clear legal grounding to the reading of subnational engagement as delegated autonomy rather than a parallel track. The very necessity of this codification reveals that a vibrant, bottom-up dynamic of local diplomatic practice had been accumulating for years, ultimately requiring formal state regularization.
Subnational Diplomacy in Action
While grand strategies like the BRI are often portrayed as highly centralized endeavors directed by Beijing, their actual implementation relies heavily on subnational governments. The decentralized approach allows local actors to tailor international projects to domestic economic needs. This operational reality reflects the concept of fragmented authoritarianism, coined by Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), in which subnational governments translate national directives into local actions by coordinating with, and sometimes subtly pushing back against, the central bureaucracy. As noted by Wong’s (2025) typology of subnational behaviors, including trailblazing, carpetbagging and resisting, differentiated local agency operates within, not against, the state’s legal architecture.
Resource flows, transnational capital, and foreign investment inevitably enhance the operational independence of local governments. For example, serving as Guangdong’s strategic bridgehead for engaging the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the municipality of Zhanjiang has proactively advanced the development of the Guangdong Fenyong ASEAN Industrial Park into a pivotal hub for international cooperation. This localized initiative provides a crucial structural vehicle for Chinese enterprises to optimize their cross-border supply chains, facilitating a synchronized expansion model characterized by “Headquarter in GBA + manufacturing in Zhanjiang + assembly in ASEAN” model (China News, 2025).
Even during periods of acute bilateral tension with nations such as the Philippines and India, China’s subnational governments generally maintained their economic interactions. This resilience showcases a hybrid model, that is, subnational diplomacy serves both as a vehicle for China’s overarching foreign policy initiatives and as a pragmatic tool for localized economic survival.
Subnational Interludes, Structural Insights: The Limits of Autonomy
That said, the delegated autonomy enjoyed by Chinese localities has strict, non-negotiable boundaries, particularly when national security, sovereignty, or human rights issues are involved. The past few years have witnessed an unprecedented wave of dissolutions of sister-city relations, starkly highlighting how national geopolitics override subnational diplomacy.
In 2016, Prague and Beijing established a sister-city relationship. But by early 2019, Prague’s new mayor, Zdeněk Hřib, demanded the removal of the «One China» policy clause from the agreement. Following Beijing’s fierce opposition and the subsequent cancellation of Czech cultural tours in China, Prague pulled out of the partnership in October 2019 (Eckert and Turcsányi, 2019; Lau, 2019). In January 2020, the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government authorized its Foreign Affairs Office to dissolve its own ties with Prague and suspend all official contacts (Fang, 2020).
Similar diplomatic severances cascaded across Europe. Swedish cities such as Gothenburg, Linköping, and Luleå suspended ties with their Chinese counterparts, that is, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Xi’an respectively, driven by diplomatic frictions between Stockholm and Beijing (Wong, 2020). In the UK, Newcastle terminated its relationship with Taiyuan over human rights concerns in Xinjiang (BBC News, 2022). Conversely, Chinese cities have proactively severed ties when foreign partners crossed historical red lines, such as Nanjing suspending its relationship with Nagoya in 2012 after the Japanese mayor questioned the historical reality of the Nanjing Massacre (Fackler, 2012). These episodes unequivocally demonstrate that while Beijing delegates economic and cultural diplomacy to local actors, the central state immediately reasserts absolute control the moment core national interests are challenged.
Conclusion and Discussion: Reconceptualizing China’s Local Agency
Rather than conforming to Western models of traditional paradiplomacy, China’s approach is best understood as delegated subnational diplomacy. It operates as a highly calibrated institutional arrangement. The central government firmly dictates the geopolitical boundaries and strategic objectives, while localities drive the economic and operational momentum. By tethering local initiative to the national grand strategy, Beijing effectively transforms provincial economic statecraft into a flexible, indispensable instrument of its overarching diplomatic agenda.
This dynamic becomes particularly revealing when viewed in a comparative light. Formal regime type, whether a state is unitary or federal, is often a poor predictor of subnational diplomatic capacity (Juste and Cao, 2025). India, despite its constitutional federalism, exhibits de facto unitary characteristics regarding its China policy; regardless of whether the INC or BJP holds power, Indian states rarely diverge from New Delhi’s geopolitical stance. Conversely, the Philippines is a unitary state, yet under its 1991 Local Government Code, local government units enjoy extensive autonomy in conducting foreign affairs. This partially explains why some Philippine local governments can continue to engage Chinese coastal provinces such as Fujian and Guangdong in productive trade diplomacy even amidst severe maritime standoffs in the South China Sea.
China’s subnational actors must continuously navigate a complex matrix of vertical coordination with Beijing and horizontal competition with each other. By recognizing that variables such as economic capacity, geographic endowment, and grassroots ambition matter just as much as formal constitutional structures, we can better understand how China truly operates on the global stage – directed from the top, but propelled from the bottom.
References
BBC News. (2022). Newcastle Ends Twinning With Chinese City Amid Torture Claims. BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-tyne-63499601 on 26 June 2026.
Belt and Road Portal. (2021). Qinghai Province’s 2021 Plan for the Division of Responsibilities in Advancing the “Belt and Road” Initiative. Belt and Road Portal. Retrieved from https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/173475.html on 23 June 2026.
Chen, X. (2018). Xi Jinping’s Diplomatic Thought Guides China’s Major-Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era. China.org.cn. Retrieved from http://www.china.com.cn/opinion/2018-08/09/content_58290909.htm on 6 July 2026. [in Chinese].
Chen, Z. (2001). Subnational governments and foreign affairs. Beijing: Long March Publishing House. pp.6. [in Chinese].
China News. (2025). Guangdong Deepens Economic and Trade Cooperation with ASEAN, Encouraging Southeast Asian E-commerce Platforms to Set Up Operations in Guangdong. China News. Retrieved from http://news.china.com.cn/2025-02/06/content_117697301.shtml on 5 July 2026. [in Chinese].
Cornago, N. (2018). Paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy. Paradiplomacy and Protodiplomacy, Gordon Martel (ed) Encyclopedia of Diplomacy (Oxford: Blackwell-Wiley) doi, 10, 9781118885154.
Eckert and Turcsányi. (2019). Prague Vs. Beijing: Estranged Sister Cities. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/prague-vs-beijing-estranged-sister-cities/ on 12 July 2026).
Fackler. (2012). Chinese City Severs Ties After Japanese Mayor Denied Massacre. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/world/asia/chinese-city-severs-ties-after-japanese-mayor-denies-massacre.html on 1 July 2026.
Fang. (2020). Shanghai Breaks With Prague Over Partnership With Taiwan. Nikkei Asia. Retrieved from https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Shanghai-breaks-with-Prague-over-partnership-with-Taiwan on 13 July 2026.
Juste, S. and Cao, T. (2025). De/Centralization, Foreign Policy and Paradiplomacy: A Comparative Analysis of Argentina and China. Chinese Political Science Review, 1-21.
Lau, S. (2019). Prague cuts sister-city ties with Beijing amid “tangible” public anger. SCMP. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3032045/prague-cuts-sister-city-ties-beijing-amid-tangible-anger-over on June 3 2026.
Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy making in China: Leaders, structures, and processes. Princeton University Press.
Liu, T., & Song, Y. (2020). Chinese paradiplomacy: A theoretical review. Sage Open, 10(1), 2158244019899048.
MFA of the PRC. (2023). The Law on Foreign Relations of the PRC. MFA. Retrieved from http://mfa.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zfxxgk_674865/zcfg/fl/202306/t20230628_11105189.shtml on June 23 2026. [in Chinese].
Nandkumar, K. (2025). Diplomacy at the Periphery: How the PRC’s Border Provinces Shape Neighborhood Engagement. Mapping China’s Strategic Space. Retrieved from https://strategicspace.nbr.org/diplomacy-at-the-periphery-how-the-prcs-border-provinces-shape-neighborhood-engagement/ on 1 July 2026.
Ren, Y. (2017). The development of subnational governmental diplomacy and its practice in cross-border regional cooperation in China. International Observation, 101–115. [in Chinese].
The Central Committee of the CPC. (2018). The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Issued the “Plan for Deepening the Reform of Party and State Institutions”. Xinhua News. Retrieved from https://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-03/21/c_1122570517.htm on 21 June 2026. [in Chinese].
The State Council of the CPC. (2020). General Plan for the China (Anhui) Pilot Free Trade Zone. The Information Office of Anhui Provincial People’s Government. Retrieved from http://fbh.anhuinews.com/project/wjxgzc/202009/t20200925_4795806.html on 23 June 2026.
Wong, A. (2018). More than peripheral: How provinces influence China’s foreign policy. The China Quarterly, 235, 735-757.
Wong, R. (2020). Gothenburg Axes Twin City Agreement With Shanghai As Sweden Closes All Confucius Institutes. Hong Kong Free Press. Retrieved from https://hongkongfp.com/2020/04/24/gothenburg-axes-twin-city-agreement-with-shanghai-as-sweden-closes-all-confucius-institutes/ on 13 July 2026).
Xi, J. (2014). Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping at China International Friendship Conference in Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the CPAFFC. China’s Diplomacy in the New Era. Retrieved from https://en.chinadiplomacy.org.cn/2022-05/24/content_78233446.shtml on 29 June 2026
Zhang, P. (2015). A study of local participation in the unfolding of China’s foreign relations. Shanghai: Shanghai Century Publishing Group. [in Chinese].
Zhao, P. (1995). On foreign affairs. Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press. [in Chinese].
